FEDERAL RULES-23b DERIVATIVE SUIT-SHAREHOLDER VERIFICATION BASED ON ADVICE RATHER THAN

AcTuAL

KNOWL-

EDGE HELD INSUFFICIENT GROUNDS TO WARRANT SUMMARY

DISMISSAL. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (U.S. 1966).
Plaintiff, a poorly educated immigrant, acting pursuant to advice
tendered by her Phi Beta Kappa son-in-law, Irving Brilliant, instituted a derivative suit by filing a verified, sixty page complaint charging the directors of Hilton Hotels Corporation with defrauding the
corporation. On its face, the complaint was in strict compliance with
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (b).1 Without requiring defendant to file an answer, the district court, despite plaintiff's objection,
granted defendant's motion to take plaintiff's oral examination.2 The
oral examination revealed that plaintiff had very little understanding
of the complaint and the nature of the lawsuit; accordingly, defendants moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that the pleading was a
sham and that plaintiff was not a proper party. Plaintiff's counsel
countered with affidavits signed by counsel and Mr. Brilliant which
demonstrated that extensive investigation had preceded filing of the
complaint.
Despite the affidavits, the district court dismissed the case with
prejudice,3 holding that plaintiff's verification, due to her inability
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). Secondary Action by Shareholders.
In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more
shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the
association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it,
the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff
was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that
the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States
jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction.
The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from
the shareholders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failure to
obtain such action or the reasons for not making such effort.
Note: Rule 23(b) has been superceded by FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1, adopted February 28,
1966, effective July 1, 1966. The new Rule restates Rules 23(b) and (c) and adds
The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or
members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association.
2 In regard to the examination, the Supreme Court stated that circumstances may
exist under which a district court could stop all proceedings in a derivative cause

of action, relieve the defendants from filing an answer to charges of fraud, and conduct a pre-trial investigation to determine whether the plaintiff had falsely sworn
that the facts alleged were either true or that he had information which led him to

believe they were true. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
3 Dismissal with prejudice in this case would prohibit Mrs. Surovitz from re-
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to understand the complaint, was false and therefore a nullity.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 4 On certiorari to
the Supreme Court, held, reversed: Considering the entire court
record, petitioner's reliance on her son-in-law's advice in verifying
the complaint was insufficient grounds to warrant summary dismissal.

Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
Four considerations prompted the reversal: (1) None of the
Federal Rules compel a court to summarily dismiss, without answer
or argument, a pleading where grave allegations of fraud are shown
by the record to be based on reasonable beliefs stemming from careful investigation; (2) the purpose behind the verification requirement of Rule 23 is to discourage "strike suits" ;5 (3) the record in this
case included not only petitioner's deposition, but also the affidavits
signed by counsel and plaintiff's son-in-law; and (4) the record, when
considered in its entirety, indicated that this was not a "strike suit,"
but an effort by plaintiff to protect her monetary investment. The
Supreme Court stated that "the basic purpose of the Federal Rules is
to administer justice through fail trials, not through summary dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion." 6 Furthermore, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should guarantee, as nearly as
possible, that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on
the merits.7
By holding that summary dismissal was improper, the Court circumvented the issue of validity of the verification, which was the
basis for the lower court holding. But in light of the revision to Rule
23, adopted at the time the Supreme Court was deliberating Surowitz, 8 the requirement for a verified pleading is still germane. It is
unfortunate that the Court did not avail itself of the opportunity in
asserting the claim against the corporate directors. The circuit courtes opinion did not

specify whether other possible shareholder plaintiffs would be similarly prohibited.
It is submitted that (1) since there was no trial on the merits, the prohibition should
be limited to Mrs. Surowitz; and (2) that plaintiffs who are capable of verifying the
pleading should be permitted to re-initiate the action.
4 Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1965).
G Strike suits are actions brought by unscrupulous shareholders who seek to profit
from the nuisance value of the suit. The plaintiffs are "'bought off" by secret settlements to the disadvantage of the general body of shareholders. See Cohen v. Industrial
Finance Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIoNs,
354 (revised ed. 1947); see generally, Comment, Extortionate Corporate Litigation:
The Strike Suit, 34 COLUM. L. REv. 1308 (1934).
6 383 U.S. at 373.
7 Ibid.
8 Surowitz was argued before the Supreme Court on Jan. 20, 1966 and decided
March 7, 1966, while FED. R. CIrv. P. 23.1 was adopted Feb. 28, 1966. The new rule
retained the verification requirement. See material cited note 1 supra.
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Surowitz to state its interpretation of the verification requirement
of Rule 23.9
The circumstances which originally prompted development of
Rule 23 are described by several contemporary opinions of the Court.
Dodge v. Woolsey 0 opened the doors of the federal courts, via
diversity of citizenship, to equitable actions brought by stockholders
against corporate directors who allegedly had failed to perform their
corporate duties. Subsequently, corporations preferring federal chancery remedies over state court remedies would avoid state trials by
having an out-of-state shareholder bring suit in a federal court. If no
non-resident stockholder existed, shares were transferred to citizens
of another state, who then brought suit. Hawes v. Oakland 1 put an
end to this practice by prescribing that, before the shareholder
would be permitted to institute suit in his own name, and conduct
litigation which historically belonged to the corporation, he must:
(1) show to the satisfaction of the court that he has earnestly
exhausted all means by which he could obtain redress of his grievance
from the corporation; (2) list with particularity what efforts had
been made to obtain redress within the corporation; (3) allege
that he was a stockholder at the time of the transactions of which
he complains, or that the shares devolved on him since the time of
the transactions by operation of law; and (4) prove that the suit
12
was not a collusive one to invoke federal jurisdiction.
In a comparatively recent case, Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,
the Supreme Court explained the need for exceptional procedural
regulations in derivative actions on the basis that
a stockholder who brings suit on a cause of action derived from the
corporation assumes a position, not technically as a trustee perhaps,
but one of a fiduciary character. He sues, not for himself alone, but
as representative of a class comprising all who are similarly situated.
The interests of all in the redress of the wrongs are taken into his
hands, dependent upon his diligence, wisdom and integrity. And
9 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "the crucial issue presented
by this appeal, namely, the interpretation of the verification requirement of Rule (23b)
is without guiding precedent." 342 F.2d at 605.
10 59 U.S. 331 (1855).
11 104 U.S. 450, 460 (1881).
12 In order to effectuate the Hawes' provisos, the Supreme Court adopted Equity
Rule 94 which became Equity Rule 27 on a revision of the Equity Rules in February,
1913. See Groel v. United Electric Co., 132 Fed. 252, 256 (N.Y. 1904), and Cohen
v. Industrial Finance Corp., 44 F. Supp. 491, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Civil procedure
Rule 23(b) succeeded Equity Rule 27 and expressly enlarged its scope to apply to
all associations, incorporated and unincorporated. See 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTICE
1123.15, at 3489 (2d ed. 1964).
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while the stockholders have chosen the corporate director or
manager, they have no such election as to a plaintiff who steps
forward to represent them. He is a self-chosen representative and a
volunteer champion. The Federal Constitution does not oblige the
state to place its litigating and adjudicating processes at the disposal
of such a representative, at least without imposing standards of
responsibility, liability and accountability which it considers will
protect the interests he elects himself to represent. (Emphasis
added.) 13

In Bauer v. Servel, Inc.,14 the court stated that the purpose for the
Rule 23 provision requiring stock ownership at the time of the
alleged wrong is the preclusion of what might be characterized as
"champerty" and "maintenance."' 15 Gottesman v. General Motors
Corp.'0 further concluded that Rule 23 (b) was designed to prohibit
a subsequent purchaser of stock from speculating in litigation. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pioche Mines Consolidated, Inc.
v.Dolman,'17 stated the purposes of Rule 23 (b) to be the protection
of the courts from collusive actions' 8 and the protection of corporations and their officers from strike suits.
From the holdings in the foregoing cases, it would appear that
the purpose of Rule 23(b) is not violated if the plaintiff in a
derivative suit: (1) is a responsible representative of the shareholders; (2) has exhausted all means within the corporation by
which he could obtain redress of his grievances; (3) is not attempting to collusively invoke federal jurisdiction; (4) has not initiated
the suit as a strike suit or for "champerty" and "maintenance"; and
(5) did not purchase his stock subsequent to the occurrance of the
grievance in order to speculate.
The plaintiff in the instant case does not appear to have violated
the underlying purposes of Rule 23 unless it can be shown that,
due to her inability to comprehend the nature of the complaint,
337 U.S. 541, 549-50 (1949).
168 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
15 "'Maintenance" consists in maintaining, supporting, or promoting the litigation
of another. "Champerty" is a bargain to divide the proceeds of litigation between the
owner of the litigated claim and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation. BLACK,
'3
14

LAW DIcnoNARY (4th ed. 1951).

16 28 F.R.D. 325, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
17 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964).
18 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 162 Fed. 954, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1908)
stated:
It [Equity Rule 94] was enacted to prevent collusive actions in the federal

courts by nonresident stockholders on the ground of diversity of citizenship,
and also to prevent stockholders from asserting rights of a corporation which
should be asserted by its directors.
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she was not qualified to represent the interests of all the shareholders.
Indeed, without the assistance of her attorney and her son-in-law,
she probably would have been totally unqualified. However, it is
submitted that the court considered this competent assistance, reaching the conclusion that Mrs. Surowitz was a proper plaintiff, and
that to permit her to bring the derivative suit would be in the best
interests of the corporation.1"
In considering the verification requirement of Rule 23(b), the
Surowitz circuit court held that the plaintiff's verification was false
because she swore to the verity of alleged facts of which she was
totally ignorant.20 In arriving at its decision, the circuit court relied
on In re Frank.2 But the Frank court rejected a verification because
it purportedly sought to verify facts which contradicted facts previously testified to under oath, and because a notary public falsely
certified that the oath was made before him. Thus, Frank does not
appear to be authority for the summary dismissal of an action where
the verifier does not comprehend portions of his complaint.
In Surowitz, the respondents contended that on the authority
of Cooperv. Schlesinger2 and United States v. Bradford,3 statements
made by petitioner without personal knowledge were false statements. However, the rule applied in Schlesinger and Bradford was
founded upon statements "recklessly made," and Mrs. Surowitz'
reliance on her son-in-law's ability and sincerity was not found by
the Supreme Court to have been reckless. In their affidavits, counsel
and Mr. Brilliant described in detail their investigation and the
facts disclosed, which facts had formed the basis of the instant
complaint.2 4 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that
these affidavits would completely refute the merits of any motion
19 Rule 23.1 was adopted while the Court was deliberating Surowilz. This rule
provides that "the derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that plaintiff
does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders .....
See
material cited notes 1 and 12 supra.
20 342 F.2d at 606.
21 239 Fed. 709 (3d Cir. 1917).
22 111 U.S. 148 (1884).
23 148 Fed. 413 (E.D. La. 1905).
24 In his concurring opinion in Surowitz, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that Rule 23(b)
does not direct that the verification be that of the plaintiff, and concluded that the
affidavit of petitioner's attorney was adequate verification. 383 U.S. at 374. Authority
for this position is found in Bosc v. 39 Broadway, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 825, 827
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), which gave approval to the attorney's verification of the complaint
to satisfy Rule 23(b), further noting that the verification itself explains that the
facts are best known to the attorney. See also Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir.
1963); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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under Rule 1125 directed against this complaint, but held that neither
affidavit would operate to offset plaintiff's positive disavowal during
the oral examination of any relevant knowledge or information,
other than knowledge that she owned stock.26 The circuit court
further concluded that since there had been no motion for a substituted verification in the district court, and no submission of an
amendment to the complaint, the question of whether counsel's
affidavit could serve as a verification was not in issue.27 It thus
appears that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal
of the complaint with prejudice solely on the basis that the petitioner
could not comprehend the complicated matter presented in her
complaint.
In reversing, the Supreme Court declared that reliance on such
grounds for granting summary judgment violates the basic purpose
of the Federal Rules, i.e., to administer justice through fair trials.
In the ultimate holding, the Court seemingly placed little emphasis
on the necessity for a verified pleading. However, the majority did
state that "so far as the language of the complaint and of Mrs.
Surowitz' verification were concerned, both were in strict compliance

with the provisions of Rule 23 (b)

... .",28

In addition:

She [petitioner] did know ...that she had put over $2,000
of her hard-earned money into Hilton Hotels stock, that she was
not getting her dividends, and that her son-in-law who
had looked
29
into the matter thought that something was wrong.
It is submitted that if the verification, on its face, was in strict
compliance with the provisions of the Rule, and petitioner had
sufficient knowledge to verify that the claim was not brought for
its nuisance value as a strike suit, nor collusively to obtain federal
jurisdiction, it would be sufficient to rely upon expert advice to
25 F ED. R. Civ. P. 11. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1958). This rule requires in part that
the "signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."
26 342 F.2d at 607.
27 Id. at 608.
28
29

383 U.S. at 365.
Id. at 370. The Court further stated:
She also knew that her son-in-law was qualified to help her and she trusted
him. It is difficult to believe that anyone could be shocked or harmed in any
way when, in the light of all these circumstances, Mrs. Surowitz verified the
complaint, not on the basis of her own knowledge and understanding, but
in the faith that her son-in-law had correctly advised her either that the
statements in the complaint were true or to the best of his knowledge he
believed them to be true. ibid.
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verify the technical details of the complaint upon information
and belief.
It seems that in arriving at its liberal verification requirement,
the Supreme Court was persuaded in part by the desire to protect the
little investor from the "wiles of insiders who are willing to betray
their company's interest in order to enrich themselves."8 0 It would
appear that this liberalization is a reaction to the apparent trend

of state legislation in restricting derivative suits by small investors.81
At the time Equity Rule 94 was adopted,8 2 the Supreme Court
expressed a desire to limit federal jurisdiction of shareholder derivative suits because it determined they were more properly handled
by state courts. Surowitz indicates that the Supreme Court is now of
the opinion that federal court jurisdiction over derivative suits
should be liberalized to insure that all responsible shareholders
receive an opportunity to protect the interests of the corporation.
But, in approving the practice of pre-trial investigation as a means

of determining the relevant facts underlying a verification, the
Supreme Court has failed to abrogate the use by a defendant of an
80 "[I]t is not easy to conceive of anyone more in need of protection against such
schemes than little investors like Mrs. Surowitz." Id. at 371.
81 The derivative suit was born in Equity to combat abuses by corporation directors.
It allows shareholders to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the
restitution he could not demand on his own. This remedy was long the chief regulator
of corporate management and has aforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser
forms of betrayal of stockholders' interest. It is argued, and not without reason, that
without it there would be little practical check on such abuses. See Cohen v. Beneficial

Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

In recent years, a number of states, largely influenced by "special interests," have
passed legislation imposing on small shareholders the requirement of posting bond
for defendants reasonable expenses. This legislation has the practical effect of barring
the vast majority of stockholders who cannot meet the quantum requirements and who
fear risking ruin for something which will benefit them very little personally. See Note,
71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 957; see generally 2 HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE 223 (1959).

But see 13

FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONs,

at 492 (per-

manent ed. 1961).
Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L Rav. 1, 3.
The New York state legislation, since aped in other commercial states, was
clearly designed to insulate corporate management from investors who discovered that the corporation had been looted. Had the legislators really been
concerned with the so-called "abuse" of stockholders' suits, the extortionate
secret settlement, the remedy was painfully obvious: to bar secret settlements.
Since the Federal Rules meet the problem directly by prohibiting secret
settlements, the writer believed that the federal courts would not look kindly
upon barriers deliberately interposed to make difficult or impossible the
obtaining of restitution for corporate wrongs. The reaction of the judges
in the federal courts was precisely as anticipated . . . . Id. at 12.
See generally BAKER & CARY, CORPORATIONS, CASES AND MATERIAL, 646 (3d ed.
1949) ; 52 MICH. L. REv. 748, 749-50 (1954).

82 Rule 94 was adopted in 1881 shortly after Hawes was decided. See comments
in note 12 supra.
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effective delaying tactic. 3 The broad purpose of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure-to encourage simple, speedy adjudication of
claims 34-- might be more readily achieved by following the California

practice. In California, "if a verification appears to be made by a
person authorized by law to do so and complies in form and substance
with the statutory provisions, it must be regarded as sufficient ... 85

By holding verifications prima facie sufficient, courts prevent delay
and expense in hearing the specifications required by Rule 23(b). O

Quaere, if a verification is not held prima facie sufficient, of what
value is it to the pleading?
A prosecution for perjury is the prime sanction against a person

who knowingly swears to a false pleading. 7 The objection to the
requirement for verified pleadings is that enforcement by means
of perjury prosecution is ineffective and therefore seldom used."
If this argument is valid, measures should be taken to increase the

effectiveness of perjury proceedings. When, as in Surowitz, a plaintiff
verifies the entire complicated pleading, he frequently must verify
technical matters outside his knowledge and scope of understanding.3 9 In such cases, the plaintiff verifies a major portion of the
pleading on information and belief. It has been judicially determined

"that perjury cannot be assigned upon a statement which is merely
an expression of belief or opinion." 40 This proposition, however, is

subject "to the qualification that a charge of perjury or false swearing
may be based on a statement under oath as, or embodying, a matter
33 In Surowitz, the pre-trial investigation and resultant controversy were extremely
effective in delaying the suit. "It has now been practically three years since the
complaint was filed and as yet none of the defendants have even been compelled to
admit or deny the wrongdoings charged.'They should be." 383 U.S. at 374.
34 See Leonard F. Fellman Co. v. Smith-Corona Marchant Inc., 27 F.R.D. 263
(E.D. Pa. 1961).
35 French v. Smith Booth Usher Co., 56 Cal. App. 2d 23, 29, 131 P.2d 863, 866
(1942); accord, Ware v. Stafford, 206 Cal. App. 2d 232, 24 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1962).
30 "Even those courts which apparently are of opinion that the verification is not
necessary concede that verification tends to prevent delay and expense in hearing of
frivolous specifications, and that undoubtedly the better practice is to require a verification." Manson v. Inge, 13 F.2d 567, 568 (4th Cir. 1926).
37 ROSENBERG & WEINSTEIN, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
38 Ibid.
30 Manson v. Inge, 13 F.2d 567, 569 (4th Cir. 1926)

368 (1962).

("To require the specifica-

tions to be verified positively or on personal knowledge would place an undue burden
.. . [on the verifier where the facts lie particularly in the personal knowledge of
the defendant]."). See also Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); In re Eastern Supply Company, 170
F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
40 66 A.L.R.2d 792 (1959); accord, Umbriaco v. United States, 258 F.2d 625 (9th
Cir. 1958); Numberger v. United States, 156 Fed. 721 (8th Cir. 1907).
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of belief or opinion where such belief or opinion is not in fact held
or entertained." 41 Perjury prosecution could therefore be made more
effective by minimizing the use of verification based on information
and belief. It is submitted that this can be accomplished by apportioning the verification of the pleading such that each part of the
pleading is verified in the following manner.
Plaintiff should be required to verify--on personal knowledgethe statement of facts presented to the district court which demonstrates that: (1) The plaintiff was a shareholder at the time of
the transaction of which he complains, or that his share thereafter
devolved on him by operation of law; and (2) the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on the courts of the United
States. Furthermore, that portion of the complaint setting forth
with particularity plaintiff's efforts to secure through corporate
means the relief he desires could be verified in part by the plaintiff,
and in part by persons who are informed of and believe the details
of such endeavors, and who are able to understand their legal
technicalities. That portion of the complaint which plaintiff verifies
should be restricted to the specific acts of which he had knowledge
and understanding. In accordance with the Supreme Court holding in
Surowitz, affidavits, even though not presented as verifications, would
be sufficient to satisfy the verification requirements of persons other
than the plaintiff.
By apportioning the verification requirements in this manner, the
pleading is verified as much as possible on actual knowledge, and
verification on information and belief is restricted. Furthermore,
restricting verifications on information and belief to technically
qualified persons would decrease the susceptibility of the verifications
to the sanctions of a perjury prosecution.
ROBERT F. GUsKY
41 66 A.L.R.2d at 793; accord, United States v. Demos, 291 Fed. 104 (D.C. Fla.
1923).

